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Process Thought From an
Evangelical Perspective:
An Appreciation and Critique
By Stephen T. Franklin
I rst encountered Whitehead's philosophy as an undergraduate in a hybrid
course entitled "Process and Analytic Philosophy." The eight required texts in-
cluded Whitehead's Process and Reality. The professor, whose interest at the time
lay neither in process nor analytic philosophy but in existentialism, gave us no
preparation tor this encounter. I vividly remember my bewilderment as I began. It
is only a slight exaggeration to say I was unable to understand a single sentence
in the rst 50 or 60 pages, although the words individually seemed simple enough
and the grammar not particularly complex. I never nished the book.
I have since learned that without a knowledgeable guide, rst encounters
with Process and Reality, and indeed with Process thought in general, often produce
similar reactions. There are some good reasons for this. Alfred North Whitehead
produced a metaphysical vision of extraordinary originality, and to express his
insights he created a vocabulary in which he sometimes invented new words but,
more often, redefined old words to fit his needs. This can make entry into his
world quite daunting.
Yet once one gets a feel for the vision as a whole and learns a little of the
basic vocabulary, Whitehead's philosophy is not particularly difficult. Excluding
the strictly mathematical and logical sections, I think Process and Reality is easier
to read than Aristotle's Metaphysics.
After struggling for 2,000 years with Aristotle's metaphysical scheme, Chris-
tian theologians have come to a solid understanding of its advantages and disad-
vantages. Whitehead's philosophy is much younger and less well-known. Some
Christian theologians have struggled with it, but they have not often been Evan—
gelical. Indeed, both Evangelical and non-Evangelical thinkers alike have tended
In the past, both Evangelical theologians and Process scholars have often misunderstood the
perspectives and concerns of the other camp. Stephen Franklin introduces Process thought
to Evangelicals, showing how Process thought addresses central Evangelical concerns. He
also considers the limitations of Process thought from an Evangelical point of view. Lastly he
explains to Process scholars why Evangelicals have a serious stake in the analysis of human
experience, whether or not explicitly religious, and thus why Evangelicals have a natural
basis for using the categories of Process thought. Mr. Franklin is Professor of Theology and
Philosophy at Tokyo Christian University.
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to see Process thought and Evangelical theology as mutually exclusive alternatives.
This is unfortunate because Whitehead's philosophy emerges out of and speaks to
issues that many reective Evangelicals have confronted in the twentieth century.
We Evangelicals, at least those of us who are American, have grown up in
a culture not only focused on modern science, industry, and technology but also
descended from the Enlightenment with its emphasis on personal autonomy and
social liberation. We may not always approve of the culture in which we find
ourselves, but we cannot escape it. Its issues become our issues—its problems,
our problems. Process and Reality critiques precisely these issues and problems.
Whitehead's affirmations nearly always illuminate, while, quite unexpectedly, his
criticisms often parallel those proffered by Evangelicals.
Thus I begin this paper in something of a dilemma. While Process thought
emerges out of some very down-to-earth concerns, outsiders often perceive pro-
cess thinkers as engaged in highly technical and even esoteric exchanges among
themselves. My rst task, therefore, is to present Process thought so as to highlight
its connections to contemporary Evangelical life. To this end, I will begin auto-
biographically. This is not to say my intellectual life is particularly important or
interesting. While every personal history has its unique elements, mine is quite
ordinary. But that is precisely the point. By showing where Whitehead spoke to
central issues in my own intellectual journey, and where he did not, perhaps I can
cast light on the potential signicance of Process thought for other Evangelicals.
And perhaps I can remind those outside the Evangelical tradition that the central
issues for Evangelicals mostly overlap the central issues all Christians must face.
To do this, I sketch some of the main motifs of Whitehead’s Process thought, with
an eye towards their implications for the issues raised in my “representative” au-
tobiography. Lastly I highlight the Evangelical distinctives where Process thought
has typically been seen, not as an aide to, but in conict with Evangelicalism.
A Christian Child in a World of Science
Being the son, grandson, and greatgrandson of Protestant pastors guaranteed
that I would confront the demands of the Christian faith. I know my greatgrand-
father only through stories and the devotional books he wrote for his congre-
gations. My grandfather, a chaplain in World War I, served as a pastor and, for
twenty-ve years, as an administrator in our denomination. While he represented
a conservative anti-evolutionary Protestantism, he also worked hard to prevent the
premillenialists and dispensationalists from establishing their theological distinc-
tives as the denominational norm. I was born while my father served as a Marine
Corps officer in WWII. Later he studied for the ministry at Princeton Theological
Seminary. The seminary assigned us a faculty house close to Einstein's. I can clearly
remember one of his relatives who lived with him passing out her sugar cookies
to us neighborhood children.
In the mid 1950's, my family moved to the Panama Canal Zone, an American
oasis in Latin America, where my father pastored a Union Church. Somewhat
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removed from developments ”back home,” the Canal Zone in the late 1950's 73
reected the generic Protestant consensus of the United States in the 40's and early
50's. My America was a Protestant country
The Canal Zone may have been the only place in the world where the law
required the head of government to be a licensed engineer. Every Canal Zone
governor was a high ranking officer in the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
This envirorunent shaped the schools which strongly emphasized science and
mathematics. The Canal Zone stood surrounded by the poverty and ignorance
of the Panama, which was as Roman Catholic as we were Protestant.
Iust as the sun outshone the stars, so in my world, it lay in the very nature of
things that America should shine brightest among the nations. This pre-eminence
had two sources in my mind: the Protestant faith and natural science. While still in
high school, I decided to study philosophy in college for one reason: the relation of
science and religion was by no means obvious to me. And yet these two together
forged the very heart of the strength of the America I knew. Rather my concern
centered on two issues. First, American’s strength and nancial future, and even my
personal health, obviously required the best in science and technology. Yet science
itself seemed wholly indifferent to any values, whether political or religious. If, as
I was taught and believed, Iesus Christ determines what is good and evil, what is
right and wrong, then how could a religiously indifferent science be good? Second,
why did the methods of coming to truth seem so different in school and in church,
that is, in science and religion. Did science really provide the model for knowledge;
and if so, how can we know that God exists?
Religion, Science, and Immanuel Kant
Like most Protestant liberal arts colleges in the 1960's, my undergraduate col-
lege taught philosophy as the history of western ideas and thought. This “classical”
approach left me with three basic conclusions}
First, the fundamental questions conceming the nature of science and religion,
and their interconnections, had been set forth by Immanuel Kant. According to
Kant we human beings construct our knowledge, our world, and even ourselves.
This act of construction, however, separates us from the real world as it is in itself,
"out-there.” That is, since the world we experience is the world we ourselves have
shaped, it follows that we can never know the world as it exists in itself apart from
our shaping activity. In Kant’s own vocabulary, the phenomenal world in which
we live day-by-day emerges from the interaction of the a-priari categories of the
mind with the noumenal world which lies forever beyond our conceptual grasp?
lOne of my philosophy professors, now retired, read an earlier version of this paper. He urged
me to note that these were my own conclusions and not those of the department.
20f course we might dismiss Kant with the quip that “That’s not how our language works.”
The problem is, however, that Kant put his finger on an issue that dominates not just
philosophy but modern Westem (and increasingly Oriental) culture as a whole. For more
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Kant’s position has enormous implications for both the nature of science and
the truth of religion. It means that scientic l<nowledge~its cognitive content-
extends only to the phenomenal world. The world scientists uncover is nothing
other than the world they as human beings have shaped. The world as such lies
beyond the reach of the scientic method. Th.is of course is a very modest reading
of the epistemological claims of the scientic enterprise?
Kant’s position, while unacceptable to many working scientists, does not cut
to the heart of the scientic enterprise. Most consumers (and funders) of scientific
research, and even perhaps some scientists, do not greatly care whether science
delivers the world itself into our hands or just the world as it appears to us.
Kant’s philosophy does, however, pierce to the marrow of classical Christianity
The Christian faith is empty apart from God. And the word “God,” at least in
orthodox theology, means nothing if it does not connect us to what is the case,
to what lies beyond and stands prior to our human existence and power, and to
what exists in the noumenal world. Of course the human experience of “God” is
humanly shaped, at least i.n part; but orthodox theology demands that there be
“more to the story."
Kant presented Christian theology with a fundamental dilemma. Either the
ologians could keep the cognitive content of their doctrines at the cost of sacricing
any reference to God as such; or they could keep the connection with God as such,
at the cost of sacricing their cognitive content. Kant himself chose the second horn
of this dilemma. He held that the Christian religion connects us with the noumenal
world by giving us the "practical" presuppositions of ethics and human action.
That is, as we act, we do so as ethical beings, and our actions implicitly presuppose
a real "right and wrong" whose roots lie deeper than our own human creativity.
And this “practical” relation is all we need. In Kant’s own vocabulary, our doctrines
about “God” do not provide us with theoretical knowledge.
On my reading, Kant gave voice to the direction in which Western culture,
quite apart from the discipline of philosophy, was headed. And the larger culture
than two centuries, Westerners have lived in a culture of interpretation. The rise of historical,
sociological, psychological, and economic modes of thought have all tended to the same
conclusion as Kant’s: we do not deal with reality as such but only with the world as shaped
by our historical situation, our sociological status, our gender, our psychological needs, and
our economic interests. And, as mentioned in the main text, even language itself is not a
privileged route of access to the world, but simply one more way of organizing that world,
one that varies enormously from time to time and place to place.
3Today scientists routinely acknowledge the influence of the scientist/observer upon their
observations. This is related to Kant’s point. There may even be a historical link between the
scientic claim and Kant’s philosophy, though I have yet to see this substantiated. Kant’s
philosophy, however, leads to a more radical conclusion. For Kant there is a fundamental
bifurcation between the world in itself and the world we perceive. This is more than the mere
claim that the observer influences some aspects of the observation. Rather, Kant is claiming
that the observer’s aepriori categories shape all aspects of the observed phenomena, thus
denying the observer any knowledge of the true character of the observed items apart from
and prior to the observer's structuring of those items. According to the Kantian interpretation,
scientists do not deal with the real (i.e., the noumenal) world.
Process Thought From an Evangelical Perspective: An Appreciation and Critique
has continued to move in this direction ever since. Of course, this theme has
spawned endless variations. And, whereas Kant saw the categories of the mind as
invariant and absolute, later scholars catalogued the ever-moving kaleidoscope of
culture, language, class, and biology. In a sense, even postmodernism does no more
than yet again reincarnate Kantian philosophy, this time with an overwhelming
sense of our human power to shape our own world but without Kant’s conviction
that, it not doctrine, then at least human ethics and practical action could place us
into deep connection with God and the noumenal world.
This historical approach to philosophy could also be applied to science, and
this left me with a second basic conclusion. The history of modern science can be
seen as a sustained, multi-generational effort to drop the category of purpose from
our understanding of the world, that is, to eliminate Aristotle's so-called “final
cause." It puzzled me how Evangelicals can strain at the gnat of evolution, even
when restated in theistic terms, while swallowing whole the camel of a mechanistic
understanding of biology, economics, and above all psychology. Yet we live in
a world drenched in felt purpose. Our experience of telos in nature is at least
as primitive as our experience of its measurable attributes of mass, shape, and
velocity. My earlier puzzlement about science, which ignored the standards of
truth to be found in Iesus Christ, widened into a broader confusion about how
science could say anything about the world we really live in, whether Protestant
or Roman Catholic, Christian or non—Christian, or religious or non-religious.
My collegeyears overlapped Vatican II, which rendered my earlier experiences
of Catholicism somewhat obsolete to say the least. Ialso gained a highly appreciated
acquaintance with Thomas Aquinas. The Roman Catholics claim Thomas as “their
own/'4 and this helped to reshape my estimation of Roman Catholicism. VVhile
my professors tended towards Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth, I found myself
gravitating towards Aquinas. Even while remaining squarely in the reformation
heritage of sola gratia, sola de, and sola scriptura, I could not ignore Aquinas’
analysis, particularly his doctrine of ”esse” as interpreted by E. Gilson. This became
the third conviction. While the Bible surely provides the fundamental norms for
all doctrinal claims, nonetheless, Christian theology requires some scheme, which
traditionally meant metaphysics, to provide a vocabulary in which to articulate the
implications of the Christian faith for the larger culturei
Whitehead and American Christianity
The move from undergraduate to graduate education merely meant traveling
across Chicago, from North Park College on Chicago's north side to the University
of Chicago on the south. While life at the University proved exciting and challeng-
ing in most ways, the one place where I had expected the transition to be difficult,
4Thomas was not a Roman Catholic in the modern sense, since he lived before the break-up of
Latin Christianity in the Reformation and the council ofTrent and, thus, before the appearance
of the Protestant and Roman Catholic communions as we understand them today. Thomas
belongs to the common heritage of Western, Latin Christianity.
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it was not. It was merely disappointing. I began my graduate education in the
philosophy department, where I had been looking forward to a vigorous debate on
the God Question. I found almost complete indifference. To be sure, the department
offered classes on Aristotle, Thomas, and Scotus, where the theistic option at least
gained a hearing. But sadly, such classes were mainly taught by ”holdovers” from
an earlier era who retained no political clout within the department. The majority
of my professors, those who held the keys to doctoral success, had no such interest.
I moved on to the Divinity School, where at least the question was taken seriously.5
The Divinity School provided a new category, philosophical theology, which
perfectly defined my interests. Like so many other young Evangelical Christians,
my deepest commitments were to the Gospel. Therefore it was not enough for me
to be a philosopher who happened to focus on religion. Rather, I was a theologian,
and a Christian theologian at that. And yet precisely as a theologian Wishing to
5In the philosophy department, I encountered the extraordinary belief, held ir\ practice if not
in theory, that the history of philosophy began with the later Bertrand Russell. But the only
way I could make sense of "Analytic Philosophy" as taught in the philosophy department
was to see its links with the problems Kant had raised. It seemed to me then, as it still does
now, that I was dealing with philosophers who had, to put it in vastly oversimplied terms,
replaced Kant's a-priori categories of the mind with ordinary language. While I could nd
many professors willing to examine counter factuals or analyze the difference between “could
have” and "should have,” I could find none interested in examining the historical and logical
presuppositions of the method itself. To me, the philosophers seem strangely indifferent to
philosophy.
Iust as my initial reactions to Roman Catholicism changed over time, so have my percep-
tions of Analytic Philosophy. Some years after I had left the philosophy departrnent, Stephen
Toulmin ar\d Alan Ianik published Wittgensfeirfs Vienna (1973) which concretely documented
the deep roots ofWittgenstein's thought in neo-Kantian philosophy as it flourished in turn—of-
the-century Vienna. This not only confirmed my intuitions, but more importantly it evidenced
an increasing interest among Analytic Philosophers in the history of philosophy. Of course,
even thirty years ago, some Roman Catholic analytic philosophers——Elizabeth Anscombe
comes easily to mind—demonstrated a serious interest in Aquinas. The intervening decades
have seen an increasing number of Analytic Philosophers pu.rsuing the history of philosophy
quite vigorously. And today the analysis of Christian theological concepts has become posi-
tively de rigueur in some analytic circles. But thirty years ago, this all lay in the distant future.
While all schools of philosophy certainly engage in the clarication of concepts, and
while such clarication is often highly useful, nonetheless I have three critical observations
concerning an exclusive reliance on linguistic analysis. First, as the Marxists have correctly
observed, if we merely analyze the current structure of our language (or world view) and
accept the results as somehow normative, we necessarily end up affirming the current social
arrangements as well as the associated forms of science and knowledge. While the Marxists are
wrong to assume these social arrangements are necessarily unjust or outmoded, they are right
when they argue we should subject them to the test of justice. lwould add that we must be free
to movebeyond our old ways of speaking about the world and to explore alternatives. Second,
if done mono-culturally with the assumption that such an analysis gives us a normative
(or even just the-best-wecan-get) understanding of our world, it unfairly and uncritically
devalues the cultures of those who speak a language, such as Iapanese, unrelated to the
lndo-European family. Third, if we consider linguistic analysis to be a form of transcendental
deduction, as I would, then the problems mentioned in the main text concerning Kantian
philosophy are simply recapitulated ”in a new key” i.n Analytic Philosophy.
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express the Gospel in my ov\m mixed world of religion, science, and national crisis
(the Vietnam War had begun), I needed to use the tools of culture, which meant,
above all else, philosophy and language, but which included, at least in principle,
history, literary theory, and the natural and social sciences. During this time, I again
met Process and Reality, a good number of years after the rst unfortunate encounter.
This time the book made sense, largely due to Langdon Gi1l<ey' s skillful lectures.
Whitehead’s central premise is actually quite simple: one event can include
another event. For example, my trip from Chicago to Tokyo can include a stopover
in Los Angeles. lust as a thought experiment, let us try to view our world, not in
the traditional way as composed of substances, but in a radically different way,
as composed of events. To say that the world is constituted by events certainly
violates our normal way of talking about the world and about events. Whitehead
had to stretch and rework the notion of an "event." For example, he argued that
the present event includes its past events, whereas it does not directly include its
contemporary or future events. Again, he argued that most basic events are very
brief. His reworking of the notion of an event is extensive and radical.
Before rejecting Whitehead’s vision as simply offbeat, notice what he achieved
with this simple reconceptualization of an "event." The premise is that the new
event includes the past events within its own identity. This means there is no
absolute or unbridgeable gap between the new event and the old events, between
the "out-there" and the "in-here,” between (in the human case) the self and the
other, between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. In short, Whitehead
provided a powerful answer, the rst I had even encountered, to Kant!’
5Whitehead’s notion of one event including another also sheds light on a medieval debate
about knowledge. Many Medievals argued that knowledge required the object known to be
present in the knower. It was understood that this was a special kind of presence “in the mode
of knowledge." The scholars of that age offered a variety of explanations for this, typically
suggesting that the “form” (in a basically Aristotelian sense) somehow passed, via the senses,
from the object "out-there" into the mind or soul "in-here." Process thought agrees with this
medieval principle, though not necessarily with their explanation of it. In fact, Whitehead can
be interpreted as generalizing from that epistemological principle into the realm of ontology.
Each subject (each new event) is related to the larger world only because there is some sense
in which that outside world is present in the subject. That is, the medieval epistemological
principle would be a specic case of the ontological principle.
What hindered the Medievals from moving from the epistemological to the ontological
interpretation of this principle was a substant-ialist view of reality. As Aristotle remarked,
one substance cannot be predicated (that is, be present in) another. Whitehead's ontology of
events directly contradicts this dictum.
At the same time, however, the scholastics sometimes held an altemative view of a
“substance” as a dynamic center of activity that held together a variety of forms over a period
of time. While still far from Whitehead's position, it does offer some stri.ki.ng parallels and
perhaps some opportunities for constructive interaction with Process thought. In any case, the
existence of this half-forgotten Medieval alternative clearly indicates the extent to which a far
more mechanical view of substance has dominated Western thought from Descartes onward,
where it was this mechanical view of substance (derived from, or at least supported by, the
successes of the early modern sciences such as physics and astronomy) that Whitehead was
most directly concerned to refute.
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This simple device of imagining the world as constituted by events highlights
the alternative metaphors that implicitly dominate Kant’s thinking. While, as
Heidegger observed long ago, Kant assigns a certain priority to time over space
within his categories of the mind, nonetheless, Kant’s analysis as a whole rests on
the implicit nonnativity of spatial metaphors. The categories of the mind "in-here”
interact with a world "out-there” to produce the phenomena as they appear to me.
If we use the word “substance” somewhat loosely and intuitively, I think we can say
that Kant presupposes that both the mind "in-here" and the world ”out—there" are
substances or a multiplicity of substances. Since one substance cannot be present
in another, it follows that the world "out-there," or the substances ”out—there,”
cannot be present to me “in-here.”
The heart of classical Christianity, and thus Evangelical Christianity, dies
without the conviction that in ]esus Christ, in the proclamation of the Word, and
in the Christian life (including for some the sacraments), we truly have to do with
God. This of course is precisely what Kant brought into question. So any challenge
to the Kantian bifurcation of noumena and phenomena deserves a closer look from
Evangelicals, and not just Evangelicals but from all those Christians who consider
their doctrines to be, among other things, claims about "what is the case."
Experience, Power, and the Evangelical Life
American Evangelicals speak the language of experience. We meet Iesus. For
us, being ”bom again” refers to an experience. In the Holiness and Pentecostal
traditions, one hears of a “second blessing," "speaking in tongues,” and "deeper
]ife”—all of which are experiential. Church members often quote the proverb,
"It is better to know God than to know about God”—which if meant seriously,
and not as an excuse for avoiding the hard work of carefully thinking through
the faith, is beyond reproach. Even the Reformed heritage, probably the least
experientially based of the Protestant traditions, can boast of Ionathan Edwards,
whose revivalistic theology found its philosophical articulation in the empiricist
categories of ]oh.n Locke.
Whitehead’s process philosophy also appeals to experience—to experience of
all sorts, even experience drunken and hallucinatory. The categories of an adequate
metaphysics must not only apply to the experience of people at their “sharpest,” say
when reading a meter i.n a physics lab, but also to every other sort of experience,
say our intuitions into our child’s fears or when waking up from a long drug-
induced sleep, In this context, Whitehead shifts roles. It is Whitehead who sticlc
quite close to our common modes of speaking in which we experience and feel all
sorts of things, whereas it is the empiricist philosophers who seem preoccupied
with a very limited range of eXperience~narnely, a conscious subject's sense
experiences, preferably those that are, in Descartes’ phrase, “clear and distinct,"
a phrase that echoes in Locke, Hume, the positivists, and not a few “ordinary”
language philosophers.
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According to Whitehead’s process ontology, there is an endless ow of new
events. The events are born with a certain “openness” about how they will develop,
but eventually they become xed. Here also, Whitehead stuck close to our normal
modes of thinking. For example, I am writing this during the earliest primaries
in the 1996 presidential race. This is a kind of event. When it starts, the outcome
15 open. But by the time you read this, the election will have taken place, and the
gutcome will be closed. Only one person will have been elected.
Whitehead differs from our common language, however, in describing this
ow of events as a ow of experiences. Each "basic" event is "an occasion of
experience" which "feels" its past events, Where these feelings are the inclusion
of the past events in the new one.
In reworking the word "experience," Whitehead strips it of any necessary
connection with sense perception. The details are complex, but Whitehead’s main
point is easy to grasp. Experience at its most basic is not something we have;
it is something we are, the being or ”esse” of all reality. In certain cases, such
as simple animals, this foundational experience develops into sensation. In a
still narrower range of cases, say the more advanced animals, sensate experience
acquires consciousness. And in an extremely narrow range of cases—apparent1y
limited to human beings, and even then, only at certain timesethis grows into self-
conscious experience. This, of course, is consistent with Evangelicalism. Whatever
else the "experience" of being born again may be, it cannot be directly seen, heard,
touched, tasted, or smelled. “Meeting Iesus” is not a photo op. And ”being filled
with the Holy Spirit," even it accompanied by colorful outbursts, cannot in principle
be shown on Candid Camera.
Evangelicals need no permission from metaphysicians before having and cher-
ishing such experiences. Yet, it can be dangerous to disconnect those experiences
from the rest of one’s life. If "meeting Jesus" has no connection with my other
experiences, it can be plausibly dismissed as a subjective projection of my “inner”
feelings upon the “outside” world. If my experience of “knowing ]esus" is an
isolated religious miracle, divorced from everyday life, it will soon lead to “The
Death of God” in practice, whether or not it is acknowledged as such.
This brings us to a quite signicant implication of Whitehead’s philosophy for
Evangelicals. One can appeal to Process thought to show that religious experiences,
such as meeting Iesus, t into a much larger class of pre-sensory experiences.
These pre-sensory experiences connect us with the noumenal world and, thus,
are more foundational than sensory experiences. It follows that since Evangelical
religion lives in this realm of pre-sensory experience, it gives us a more basic and
elemental contact with the world than does science, which is primarily oriented to
our enormously important but relatively supercial sense experiences.
In Whitehead’s philosophy, the ow of events in which one event can include
another is not only experiential, but it is also power. Whitehead is not saying that we
have experiences of something called power. Long ago, David Hume recognized
that we cannot experience power, if we are thinking of such an experience as a
relation between a subject “in-here” called a mind and an object “out-there" called
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power. More specically, if we reduce experience to sensation, and ii try to nd a
sense-datum of this thing called power, we will fail. Rather according to Whitehead,
the experiential flow of events is power. That is, power, as another name for the
fundamental experiential ow of events, is the being of the world.
Let me summarize the implications of this aspect of Whitehead's philosophy
for Evangelical theology Process thought offers us both a description and an
explanation, very powerful ones in my mind, not only of how it is possible to talk
about God but also how it is possible to actually experience God as a noumenal
reality. Evangelical religion leads inevitably, it seems to me, to the conclusion that
our basic experience is pre-sensory. Whitehead adds that such basic experience is
preconscious. This means God enters into our existence at the level of the basic
ow of events, at the level of power, at the level in which the reality "out-there"
is a part of the reality “in-here.” That is, on Whitehead’s ontology, meeting Iesus
and being baptized in the Holy Spirit refer to experiences in which God and the
noumenal world have truly entered into our hearts, into ou.r very identities. And so,
from a Process point of view, experiences such as being born again and tasting the
grace of God are consonant with those fundamental experiences which constitute
the being of the world, whereas our sense-experiences, into which God and the
Holy Spirit and Iesus do not normally seem to enter, are relatively supercial in
comparison. Whitehead can also remind us Evangelicals of the fact that we live out
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of the grace of God at the pre-conscious level as well as the conscious. Thus it is '
plausible to claim that we live in constant communion with God not only when we
are awake but when we sleep as well, and not only when we worship in church
but when we teach a mathematics class as well.
The Reintroduction of Teleological Explanations
This ow of events, in which the past world "out-there” is present in the new
event, is dynamic and goal-oriented. Some scholars, who have grown in number
since Kant, may try to convince us that we “project” values and purposes upon
a "neutral" world. But nobody lives on that basis. Yet precisely this inherently
implausible separation of value from reality has become widely accepted. The
question is why. The answer is that our culture earlier accepted the mistaken notion
that the outside world on which we allegedly "project" our values is radically
separated from our own identity. Once we admit, however, that the past world is
present in and constitutive of the new event—which in the human case means that
the “other” is present in and constitutive of the "selt”—it follows that our sense of
purpose, by which we guide our decision-making, must necessarily be rooted in
that outside world. That is, in an ontology of events, the outside world is present
in each decision-making, purposing, valuecreating subject. In short, values, goals,
and decisions, far from being only subjective, are in fact tnily present in what I
have called the basic ow of events. Our value-soaked experience, thus, emerges
out of a value-soaked world.
i1¢-ww>1%’=i
Process Thought From an Evangelical Perspective: An Appreciation and Critique
Evangelicals and other Christians live in a world of value. The Bible says that
the mountains rejoice, the trees clap their hands, and the sun, moon, and stars praise
God their creator. These are obviously metaphors and analogies. But why do we
50 often think of them as only metaphors, as only images we impose on nature. Do
not I, precisely as a Christian, live in a value-laden world in which "nature sings
and ’r0und me rings the music of the spheres”? For Whitehead, this may not be
"my Father's world,” but is a world of value. And in that sense, the process vision
comports well with the Evangelical faith.
Let us grant we live in a world of pre-sensory and pre—conscious experience
and power, in which we nd our deepest identies. This still leaves us with a
need of an explanation for the relation between the world of religion, values, and
goals and the world of technology in which we also live. An answer will emerge
to this question as we recognize that science is a very partial perspective. We must
therefore explore this notion of a "partial perspective."
According to Whitehead each event, at least those we can call basic, undergoes
its own internal development. At this point, at least, Whitehead has remained
close to our ordinary understanding of an event. Previously I used the presidential
election as an illustration of an event. To be sure, for Whitehead, an election is not a
basic event, but a connected plethora of events, and in that sense quite abstract. Yet,
as it develops, various stages are completed and add their definiteness to the event
as a whole. By the end of the election, everything has been accomplished: speeches
made, positions taken and abandoned, votes cast, ballots counted, concession
speeches made, and victory won. At the end, one candidate has been elected
president. This event gradually grows more concrete. We can describe it as a
“concrescence.”
Itwill be recalled that a basic event, what Whitehead calls an actual entity or an
occasion of experience, begins with the inclusion of its past events. The new event is,
in a sense, the world coming together and redening itself. At their crudest and least
sophisticated, events do little else than repeat their past worlds. But some events
are more creative in their reactions to their worlds, and they develop sophisticated
modes of interacting with the world, forms that we call sensations, consciousness,
and even self-awareness.
To understand Whitehead's vision, few points are more important than the
following four claims. First, sensation, consciousness, and self-consciousness all
emerge out of something tar more pi-imitive—our involvement in the world. Sec-
ond, this primitive involvement in the world is an infinitely complex set of relation-
ships, where even one relationship intertwines us with our environment and, thus,
where the entire set of relations guarantees an infinitely rich interweaving with our
environment. This is the pre-conscious world of power, relatedness, and purpose.
All reality, according to Whitehead, shares in this primitive mode of existence.
Third, precisely because this primitive mode of existence is innitely complex,
nite creatures must simplify it before they can deal with it creatively. Sensation,
consciousness, and self-consciousness, thus, are nothing other than simplied,
and so specialized, ways of interacting with the world. Ln the human case, these
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modes of specialization also include language and culture. With the introduction
of language and culture, this process becomes further specialized into natural
science, government, social status, economic interests, political life, and much
more. These specialized modes of life are all simplifications of the rich and complex
relationships out of which each basic event begins its process of concrescence. Thus
the sophisticated ways of interacting with the world are actually simplications of a
innitely more complex background. Fourth, such simplications always take place
from a particular perspective, namely, the perspective of the new event. The notion
of "simplification" requires the notion of a ”location" or "perspective" from which
it takes place. I.n short: no perspective, no simplication; and no simplication, no
creative interaction with our innitely complex world.
Process thought thus not only accounts for but insists upon the perspectival
nature of our knowledge and, indeed, upon the perspectival nature of the worlds
we create for ourselves. To this extent, Kant and the following generations of
scholars were absolutely correct. But Whitehead goes on to differ from Kant and the
majority of scholars at two points. First, all these perspectives are simplifications
and specializations of our richer, more basic existence. They are abstractions.
Second, because they emerge out of the basic flow of events, out of the presence
of the world in each new event, it follows that these perspectives do not totaHy
isolate us from the world. Yes, there is a distinction between the noumenal world
of things in themselves and the phenomenal world which we create, but both the
noumenal and phenomenal worlds are compresent within us and constitute a part
of our very identity.
In a sense, Whitehead is a critical realist concerning our sensations, knowl-
edge, a.nd language. Because it simplies the rich data out of which it emerges,
no sensation, idea, or sentence perfectly mirrors reality But nonetheless this is
not an ordinary form of critical realism because the reality out of which these
simplications emerged-—our innitely complex, pri.mitive “being in the world”—
remains present to and within each event. We live simultaneously at the level of
our basic involvement with the world and at the simplified, and so abstract, levels
of sensation, consciousness, self-consciousness, language, and culture.
We can now explore somewhat more deeply the significance of Whitehead’s
”perspectival critical realism” for the relation of religion to science. Science is an
abstraction. l.n this it is like any other human enterprise. But the simplification
inherent in the scientic method is more careful, intentional, and precise than that
of most other human activities. It pays attention only to our clean and tidy sense
experience and not the rich but messy fullness of existence out of which we live.
It prefers measurement. And it systematically eliminates purpose. The results of
science are not wrong. But the results of the scientific enterprise, however fruitful for
certain purposes from surgery to nuclear warfare, are far more partial and abstract
than most other human endeavors. The inability of science to nd purpose in the
world tells us much about science but little about the world. The lack of purpose
in science tells us only that it is possible to overlook the value~soaked texture of
our existence and yet still produce certain extraordinarily useful abstractions. One
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might say that the scientist purposefully overlooks the presence of purpose in the
very marrow of his existence and, thus, in the world he studies.
Religion which deals with God and our existence at the most basic level is
far more concrete than science. Of course, religious knowledge and theology are
abstract, just as any other human enterprise. But religious existence is precisely
that mode of being human in which we struggle to touch God, to feel the flow of
purpose, and live in relation to the power of that primitive existence out of which
all else, including science, emerges. In this sense, then, religious life is the critic
of abstractions, including the scientic ones. Neither theology nor philosophy nor
religious existence can mandate either methods or conclusions to the specialists
in the abstractions we know as physics, astronomy, biology, economics, etc. But
religious life can put these abstractions into their place as abstractions and can
refuse, in the name of the complexity and riclmess of our concrete existence in
which God meets us, to see all of life as reducible to their limited abstzactions. This
is a momentous conclusion for Evangelicals, and not just for Evangelicals.
Propositional Revelation
Since Evangelicals, by intention at least, stand in the classical Christian her-
itage, their concerns overlap those of other conservative Christians. If there is one
distinctive that sets Evangelicals apart, however, it is their stress on the Bible as
God's written revelation. For the last hundred years, propositional revelation has
been out of favor in nearly all Protestant circles beyond the most conservative.
Whitehead, however, invites us to rethink this issue.
On this point, we must become slightly technical. Whitehead radically
stretches the meaning of a "proposition." His understanding of a proposition grows
out of his larger vision, which differs greatly from the implicit world view dominant
in our culture. Since traditional philosophers developed their understandings of
a proposition in tenns of that dominant world view, it follows that Whitehead’s
notion of a proposition will be quite unconventional. To think with \/Vhitehead, we
must be willing to alter our well—worn, comfortable habits of thought.
Traditionally, we distinguish between things and ideas. Real things are objec-
tively ”out—there,” whereas ideas are subjectively ”in—here." Propositions are part of
the world of ideas, of the subjective reality "in-here." Thus we have a mental reality
”in-here” called a proposition that somehow describes or refers to some reality that
is "out-there.” This notion of a proposition often crops up, quite spontaneously so
far as I can tell, in the essays of my students. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, under
the article “Proposition,” provides a list of distinguished philosophers who held
some variation of this view.
To grasp Whitehead’s position, we must remember that both the subject
entertaining a proposition and the entities to which the proposition refers are
events, where one event can be present within another. But such a view amounts to
a challenge to the traditional vision of a proposition according to which (1) a purely
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mental reality in-here (2) refers to, means, or intends (3) some objective reality out-
there. Since both the mental and the physical, both the subjective and the objective,
and both the new subject and the past events are compresent within the new event,
it follows that for Whitehead all elements in a proposition (its sense, its reference,
the "act" of intending, etc.) are compresent within that new actual entity.7
A Whiteheadian proposition includes within itself not only the ideas (the
meaning, sense, or predicate) but also the objective realities (the objects referred
to). Such a proposition, therefore, is a hybrid reality that links a set of ideas with
some particular concrete objects. This is far from our ordinary understanding of a
proposition, but it ows with naturally and even necessarily from the fotuidations
of Whitehead’s vision.
We now come to the counter-intuitive “big leap” in our discussion. According
to Whitehead, propositions are to be found, not just in books and speech, but
throughout all reality. A full explanation of Whitehead’s position would take us far
beyond the boundaries of this short essay. But the nub of the issue is this: Whitehead
argues that the gap between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, between the
“in-here” and the ”out-there” cannot be overcome in the human case if it is not also
overcome in all reality Since a proposition precisely is a relation that integrates the
world "in-here” with the world ”out-there," it is to be found not just in human
minds but throughout all reality?
Thus if God is to work in the world, as Christians have always claimed, then
God must work in and through the propositional structures that extend throughout
all reality. The propositional structure of a book, such as the Bible, is a specic
case of this larger propositional structure. There is nothing in principle to separate
God's action in and through the propositional structures in history from God's
speech in and through propositional structures of a book. Thus one of Evangelical
theology’ s most fundamental tenants nds unexpected support and explanation
in Whitehead’s philosophy.
71 have been discussing the "canonical" proposition of Whiteheaclian metaphysics, in which
a proposition is a particular type of relation between the new actual entity and certain of its
past entities. This discussion would have to be nuanced considerably to take into account
propositions about the new entity itself, about contemporary and future entities, about other
propositions, about God, etc.
3Let me restate the issue in Whitehead’s technical vocabulary. I have lumped together physical
purposes (as a kind of proto-proposition) with regular propositions. Every actual entity
creates its own new physical purposes and thus has a propositional structure in a broad
sense. In addition, every actual entity must entertain its own initial subjedive aim which is a
proposition even in the most stringent (VVhiteheadian) denition. This initial subjective aim
is a gift from God. Thus whi.le all actual entities must entertain a proposition, it does not follow
that every entity is capable of creating its ow-n new proposition. But it does follow that some
part of every actual entity may be described as propositional in the most precise sense of
"proposition" i.n Whitehead's philosophy. Thus all reality shares in a propositional structure
both broadly-speaking (because all actual entities create physical purposes) and narrowly
speaking (because all actual entities entertain at least one proposition), even though only
some actual entities are capable of creating their own new propositions.
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God the Creator
In the relation between Evangelicalism and Process thought, not all is sweet-
ness and light. There are at least three areas of significant tension? In the rst area,
other traditional Christians would share our hesitations. The concerns expressed
in the last two areas, however, might be more narrowly Evangelical. The first has
to do with the doctrine of God the creator.
For many years Whitehead was an atheist precisely because he could not
imagine a doctrine of God apart from the doctrine of creation, and he could not
nd a way ofharmonizing a doctrine of creation with genuine and radical creaturely
freedom. Eventually he discovered that his ovxm philosophical vision required the
affirmation of a factor which could only be called God. This divine factor had many
roles: the ultimate repository of all possibilities, the maintainer of both freedom and
continuing order in the world, the provider of certain values towards which each
event might aim, and many others. What is totally missing is any airmation of
God as the creator of the very existence of the world)" Whitehead's God is more
a necessary factor in the world—albeit with many of God's traditional roles—than
the transcendent creator of the world.
Whitehead puts the issue in terms of “creativity.” In addition to its everyday
meaning in which an artist is creative, Whitehead uses "creativity" to refer to the
functioning and existence of each basic event. In this sense, “creativity” resembles
Thomas’ ”esse.” According to Whitehead, creativity, along with the one and the
many, accounts for a world in which the ”many” events fuse into "one" new event.
This fusion eventually reaches a conclusion, thus adding “one” more completed
event to the "many" events already in the world. Whitehead has given us a vision
of a world in dynamic change, genuine novelty, and radical freedom, but we still
don't have a God who creates this pullulating world. Rather Whitehead considers
God to be a factor in the ux, a creature rather than the transcendent creator.
It should be noted that Whitehead's vision does not eliminate all senses in
which God might be called the Creator of the world. Iohn Cobb has suggested that
God's role as shaper of the universe is so pervasive that we can legitimately call
God the creator.“ We must be grateful to Cobb for his careful elaboration of these
roles for God, which the Evangelical can also atrm. But this is not enough for
Evangelicals. God remains a de fucta derniurge.
Again, Whitehead, Cobb, and a host of Process theologians have shown
how God is the source of teleology, where this teleology is deeply rooted in
ou.r universe and present ir\ our primitive, pre-conscious, noumenal experience.
Values exist prior to our "normal" sensory, conscious, and specialized modes of
9Obviously, there are far more than three such issues. But these are the central ones in my mind
l”This is hardly a new or a rare criticism of Whitehead’s view of God. For example, soon
after Whitehead's full vision began to emerge, E. L. Mascall in his book, He Who Is (London:
Longmans, 1943, ch. ll), made much the same observation. It has been repeated many times
“For example, in his book, A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1965) and in many other articles and books since.
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experience, and far before the emergence of economic, cultural, or scientific modes
of human culture. Evangelicals can affirm these insights without hesitation. Asking
an Evangelical to affirm the reality of God's purposes in the world is like asking a
fish to swim. The question, however, remains. Is this enough? Evangelicals say no.
We need a Process view of deity that affirms God's creation ex nihilo. I think
this is possible. I noted that Whitehead’s original atheism stemmed from two
convictions: 1. A doctrine of God entails a doctrine of creation, and 2. A doctrine
of creation cannot be harmonized with genuine creaturely freedom. Whitehead
moved to a theistic position when he realized his emerging metaphysical system
required a factor with certain roles traditionally associated with divinity but did
not (he thought) require creation ex nihilo. In short, he re-examined his first premise.
It would also be possible, however, to re-examine Whitehead's second pre-
mise. That is, we might wish to question whether a doctrine of creation ex nihilo
necessarily undermines human freedom. This is the only route open to Evan-
gelicals. To do this, we would have to develop, within the bounds of a Process
orientation, a way of combi.ning a radical, ontologically based freedom of each
new entity with an affirmation of God as the source of that new entity's existence
or, to use Whitehead's language, of its creativity. I have suggested such a revision
in an article entitled ”God and Creativity." Whether it really works, other scholars
will have to decide.12
The Historical-Factual and Existential-Universal
In my article, "The Unique Christ as the Hope and Iudgment of the World/'13
I explore the underlying logic of Evangelical theology. That is, I try to uncover the
foundational principles which govern how Evangelicals think about their religion
uThe "bondage of the wi_ll,” of course, remains one of the classic dening points for Refor-
mation Protestantism, as compared with the later Arminian and the later revivalistic forms of
Protestantism. I am convinced, however, that for Luther and perhaps even for Calvin, the real
issue is not human freedom as such. The real issue is salvation by grace alone and the priority
of God throughout creation. In the Institutes, for example, Calvin deals with predestination,
not under the rubric of creation. Rather he discusses predestination under the doctri.ne of
Christology, meaning that we are predestined "i.n Christ" by God's grace so that salvation
is God’s gift alone.
Let us imagine a revision of VVhitehead’s doctrine of God that is compatible with a
doctrine of salvation by grace alone and that, in addition, emphasizes the priority of God's
action throughout all creation. And let's imagine that this revision also affirms human freedom
in the most radical sense. Such a revision may well comport not just with the Arminian
heritage but even more profoundly with the traditional Reformation emphases as wel.l. I
have tried to create precisely such a revision in Whitehead's doctrine of God. Ln the article
mentioned in the main text, I not only afnn the strongest possible freedom, but I also try
to do so in a way that heads us back towards the affirmation of creation ex nihilo and, thus,
towards the magisterial Reformat-ion’s radical affirmation of the absolute priority of God and
of salvation by grace alone.
13Evangelici1l Review uf Theology 17 (Ianuary 1993): 29-53.
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and indeed how they (ideally) live out the Christian life. What’ s really Evangelical
about Evangelicalisrn?
In answer to this question, I would argue that each major doctrine has two
foci. Consider the Incarnation. The Incarnation refers first to the historical event
about 2,000 years ago when God took on human nature in Iesus Christ through
the Virgin Mary. This is the historical-factual side of the doctrine. This does not
refer to the birth of Jesus insofar as modern historical scholarship can reconstruct
that event. That is, it is far more than an event in the life of the "historical Iesus"
so dear to liberal theology Rather it refers to an action at a specic place and time
which, in a very real sense, must be called God's action. While many factors entered
into that event, God's agency takes priority to such an extent that it can be called
God's action.
The historical and factual side of Christianity, however, does not exhaust the
meaning of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Incarnation also structures the lives
of Christians. The Incarnation gives sanctity to our physical existence, including
our eating, drinking, and sexual life. It also helps to explain (according to some)
what takes place in the Lord’s Supper. The Incarnation can even illumine human
experience far beyond the borders of Christianity. In Shinto, for example, we find
the divine concretely located in a mirror or rock in some shrine, which in a sense,
can be called an incamational understanding of the presence of the divine. There
are a number of names for this side of Christian doctrine, of which the "mythic"
seems to be the current favorite. Many Christians have emphasized the mythic
nature of Christian doctrines, from the gnostics, through the allegorical tradition
of Alexandria, to Schleiermacher, to Bultmann.
This side of Christian doctrine can be called “existential” because it deeply
shapes the very existence of the Christian who believes that doctrine. It can also be
called "universal" because the truth of this dimension of a doctrine can be verified,
in principle, by any believer at any place and time. The term "existential-universal"
may be a bit more awkward than “mythic,” but it seems to me more precise and
far less tendentious.
Process theology, as a part of the liberal heritage of American Cluistianity,
has strongly emphasized the existential—universal side of Christian doctrine. Evan-
gelicals, however, would ask whether Process thought can also account for the
historical-factual side of Christian doctrine?
An easy but inadequate answer would be to note that according to Whitehead,
all human existence—in tact, all existence~is in process and, so, drenched in
history. This answer is inadequate not only because it tails to specify how some
events are truly God's normative acts in a way that other events are not, but also
because Evangelicals see a danger lurking in this use of the word ”history.” Process
theologians have typically worked with a quite restricted understanding of the
historicity of God's specic actions—that is, Process thinkers have traditionally
accepted the historicity of such events as the Exodus, Incarnation, and Resurrection
only to the extent that these events can be reconstructed by the normal methods of
contemporary historical science. But this does not get us to the historical-factual side
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of Christian doctrines as understood by Evangelicals. While one side of doctri.ne
of the Incarnation can appropriately be called mythic in the technical sense of that
word, nonetheless, according to Evangelicals, it is not merely a myth. It is also an
unrepeatable divine action, at a particular place and at a particular time.
Evangelical theology holds that the historical-factual side of any doctrine,
such as the Incarnation, is normative for our understanding of its existential-
universal side. Let me illustrate. People have had a wide variety of experiences
of the presence of God within the physical dimensions of their lives. This is
the incarnational motif, the existential—universal meaning of the doctrine. These
experiences, however, are not all consistent. We Evangelicals hold that to the extent
that these experiences disagree with the historical—factual Incarnation in Christ,
they must be rejected. To the extent that these experiences directly agree with the
historical-factual Incarnation in Christ, they must be accepted. To the extent that
they neither agree nor disagree, we are invited to explore further. But always the
norm is what God did at a certain time and place in ]esus Christ.
Can Process thought move beyond a generic affirmation of the historicity
and particularity of all events? Can Process thought move beyond an affirmation
of God's generic involvement in every event to an affirmation of God's unique
involvement in certain events—where these particular events become the norm
for all other understandings of God? From an evangelical perspective, a central
desiratum for Process thought would be to develop ways of speaking about God's
special, unrepeatable, and normative action in some events, supremely the Resur-
rection of ]esus Christ understood as a real event in space and time, in a way that
is not true of others.
The Unique and Normative Christ
We have nally arrived at the point where we move beyond metaphysics and
philosophical theology to basic religious conviction. ls Christ, not at the mythic or
existential-universal level but at the level of his historical and factual uniqueness,
the sole source of all salvation and the norm by which to evaluate all religious
claims?
It is mostly liberal Christians who, up to this point, have employed the
categories of Process thought. While both liberals and Evangelicals are Christians,
and while both share many points in common, on this issue they almost always
part ways. In fact this is one of those issues that may be said to mark the boundary
between liberal and Evangelical Christianity.
In the issue of ”one way” in Jesus Christ, Evangelicals close ranks with
conservative Roman Catholics, the fundamentalists, as well as with mainstream
Christians in every age. Let us lay aside the important but secondary issues of
how widely the salvation offered in ]esu.s Christ is available, of the extent to which
salvation requires conscious awareness of the name of Jesus, and of whether or not
other religions may have helpful insights that supplement and enrich the Christian
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heritage of theological reection and religious lite. For Evangelicals, the bottom
line is this: full and complete salvation comes from Jesus and from nowhere else
Process Thinkers have not been comfortable with the claim that ]esus is the
"one way"—not even when such claims recognize the significant enrichment that
may come from the other religions as well as from non-religious traditions. The
question is this: does this dis-ease come from Process thought per se or does it come
from the religious commitments of the theologians who have thus far made use of
Whitehead's C0nceptual stnicture?
I believe that Process thought as such is, at least potentially, neutral conceming
the ”one way” of traditional Christianity. Process thought certainly does not require
the exclusiveness and nonnativity of the Cross and Resurrection as the source
of salvation. The question, however, is whether Process thought can provide a
vocabulary in which this normativity, if accepted on religious grounds, can be
expressed and with which the relation of the uniqueness of Christ to other aspects
of life can be explored. This, however, is my hope. It has yet to be demonstrated.
But on the fulllment of this hope hangs the possibility of Evangelicals’ continued
employment of the modes of Process thought to help them express the Gospel and
to explore its implications for life in our contemporary world.
